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Abstract!! !
Richard Arthur (2006) and I (Savitt 2009) proposed that the present in 
(time-oriented) Minkowski spacetime should be thought of as a small 
causal diamond. That is, given two timelike separated events p and q, with 
p earlier than q, they suggested that the present (relative to those two 
events) is the set I+(p) ∩ I-(q). Mauro Dorato (2011) presents three 
criticisms of this proposal. I rebut all three and then offer two more 
plausible criticisms of the Arthur/Savitt proposal. I argue that these 
criticisms also fail.!
!!!!!!!!!!




At the end of the twentieth century, it looked as if one question at the intersection of 
physics and metaphysics had been settled. What is the present in Minkowski 
spacetime, M? The upshot of a series of well-known papers beginning in the 1960s 
seemed to prove that one had a very limited choice. The present, at or for a spacetime 
point e ∈ M could be either the whole spacetime M or just the point e itself. The choice 
is no wider if one allows the present to be defined relative to a spacetime point e ∈ M 
and a timelike worldline γ containing e. !1
It might come as a surprise, then, that I (2009) suggested a third structure for the 
present (relative to e and γ) in M.  I then called these structures Alexandroff presents, 2
but now, to conform to the usage that seems to be standard in physics, I will call them 
causal diamonds. The first order of business must be to define them. Even though the 
discussion below will mostly concern Minkowski spacetime M, it will be useful to define 
causal diamonds in a larger class of spacetimes that includes M.!
Consider relativistic spacetimes < M,g,↑ > that are strongly causal and possess a 
temporal orientation (as indicated by the arrow). Choose two points p,q on a timelike 
 2
  The papers from which these ideas emerged were by Howard Stein (1968, 1991) and 1
by Rob Clifton and Mark Hogarth (1995). I will refer to them as SCH. These papers were 
written in response to papers by Cornelis Rietdijk (1966, 1967), Hilary Putnam (1967),  
and Nicholas Maxwell (1985, 1988).  I will discuss the implications of the results in the 
SCH papers in more detail below.
 The same suggestion can be found in Arthur (2006), and a similar idea but to a 2
different purpose in Myrvold (2003, §2). All of us were clearly inspired by the discussion 
at the end of Stein (1991). One should note also that in the philosophical literature 
causal diamonds appeared explicitly in Winnie (1997), which in turn was indebted to 
Robb (1914, 1921, 1936). 
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worldline γ in M with p earlier than q. Then the set I+(p) ∩ I-(q) is a causal diamond.  In 3
these spacetimes causal diamonds are guaranteed to exist--for instance, by Theorem 
3.27 of Minguzzi and Sánchez (2008). Such spacetimes are free of closed timelike 
curves, and the topology these sets compose, which is known as the Alexandrov (or 
Alexandroff) topology, is Hausdorff, giving one what is generally thought to be a 
physically reasonable spacetime. !
Gibbons and Solodukhin (2007a,b) distinguish between small vs. large causal 
diamonds. Small causal diamonds have a proper time separation between the defining 
end-points p and q that is small compared to the curvature scale of the ambient 
spacetime. Larger causal diamonds are those in which the later point q recedes to the 
future boundary I+ of an asymptotically de-Sitter spacetime. The cosmologists whose 
work we will sketch below employ large causal diamonds whereas Arthur and I 
proposed small causal diamonds (diamonds in which the proper time separation τ 
between the endpoints p and q is scaled to the human “specious” or psychological 
present) as (special) relativistic counterparts of the common sense present. But they are 
all causal diamonds nevertheless.!
!
2. Dorato contra Diamonds!
!
Arthur’s and my proposal was criticized in Dorato (2011). The aim of this paper is to 
evaluate these criticisms and then to add a few further thoughts of my own. In the 
course of this discussion a more detailed understanding of the proposal under fire will 
emerge.!
Dorato crisply sums up his arguments on page 391 of his paper:!
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 The set I+(p) is the set of all points in M that can be reached from p by an everywhere future-3
directed, continuous timelike curve.  The set I-(q) is the set of all points in M from which a 
continuous, everywhere future-directed timelike curve can reach q. The set J+(p) is the set 
of all points in M that can be reached from p by an everywhere future-directed, continuous 
timelike or lightlike curve. Similarly for J-(q). Some physicists think of sets like J+(p) ∩ J-(q) 
as the causal diamonds.
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(i)  [Causal diamonds have] no important applications in physical 
theories; !
(ii)  it does not seem a plausible, strong and non-arbitrary explanation of 
the extendedness of our subjective present, and !
(iii)  It does not correctly pick out the events we intend to pick out when 
we use “now” in ordinary language, !
(iv)  these seem the only reasons to introduce it. 	

I conclude that we should drop it.!
Let us examine these three criticisms, beginning with the first. My counter-claim is 
that causal diamonds are well-defined and well-motivated spacetime volumes that have 
proved, in surprising ways, increasingly handy in recent physics. Let me first advert to 
authority. Gibbons and Solodukhin (2007a, 2) say that “Causal Diamonds, or 
Alexandrov open sets, play an increasingly important role in quantum gravity, for 
example in the approach via casual sets (Sorkin, 2003), in discussions of ‘holography’, 
and also of the probability of various observations in eternal inflation models (see 
Bousso et al., 2007, for a recent example and references to earlier work).” Consider, for 
instance, holography.!!
Thomas Banks and William Fischler have been working for a decade or so on a 
generalization of string theory and quantum field theory they call Holographic Space-
Time (HST). According to Banks in a recent overview of their work (2013, 2), “The basic 
geometrical object, for which HST provides a quantum avatar, is a causal diamond… A 
time-like trajectory can be viewed as a nested sequence of causal diamonds.” !
To give a simple, related example, let us look at figure 3 of Bousso (2002), a review 
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The caption of the illustration says this: “The four null hypersurfaces orthogonal to a 
spherical surface B. The two cones F1 and F3 have negative expansion and hence 
correspond to light sheets. The covariant entropy bound states that the entropy on each 
light sheet will not exceed the area of B. The other two families of light rays, F2 and F4, 
generate the skirts drawn in thin outline. Their cross-sectional area is increasing, so 
they are not light sheets. The entropy of the skirts is not related to the area of 
B.” (Bousso, 2002, 842) The two cones, F1 and F3, form a causal diamond. This is only 
one result of many in the investigation of the holographic principle, but it is one.!
The utility of causal diamonds depends on several of their features. First, the 
volume of a causal diamond is finite, and the area of its boundary is finite. Second, its 
boundary consists of null or lightlike surfaces. Third, the points in the diamond defined 
by two points (say p and q) are all those points that can effect some point on a timelike 
curve extending from p to at q and can also be effected by some (other) point on that 
curve. Bousso imagines an experiment starting at p and ending at q. He claims (Bousso 
2000b, especially §2), following Susskind, that physics need take account of only the 
set of factors that can reciprocally influence the experiment. If so, then physics need 
consider only events in the causal diamond defined by p and q.!
Bousso and Susskind (2011) use causal diamonds for two other purposes. First, 
they use the boundaries of causal diamonds to define an objective notion of 
decoherence. When a particle entangled with an apparatus at some event crosses the 
border of a diamond they define, then (in their view) irreversible decoherence occurs 
and (in their terms) the event happens. Thus they say in §3.3:!
Causal diamonds have definite histories, obtained by tracing over their 
boundary, which we treat as an observer-independent environment. This gets 
rid of superpositions of different macroscopic objects, such as bubbles of 
different vacua, without the need to appeal to actual observers inside the 
diamond. Each causal diamond history corresponds to a sequence of things 
that “happen”. And the global picture of the multiverse is just a representation 
of all the possible diamond histories in a single geometry: the many worlds of 
causal diamonds!!
In addition to providing objective decoherence, Bousso and Susskind, then, use 
causal diamonds as the many worlds out of which they construct the multiverse in their 
“multiverse interpretation of quantum mechanics”.!
 5
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These are some (admittedly, speculative) ways in which causal diamonds have 
entered into physical theory. I must leave it to the reader to decide whether they are 
“important”. What I would like to emphasize is that causal diamonds are a natural 
structure to fasten on, since they contain all the spacetime events that can interact 
causally with events on a timelike  worldline γ between the two events, p and q, that 
define the diamond. !
Let me tackle next Dorato’s third criticism. Suppose I were to say, on some cold, 
rainy Vancouver morning, “The sun is surely shining now in Rome.” What I would have 
intended by this (as long as I am not explicitly thinking relativistically) is to pick out 
events in Rome that are happening at the same time as my utterance and to suppose 
that those events are part of a sunny day there. To be more pedantic, as far as our 
common sense, pre-relativistic way of conceiving time goes, my utterance occurs in 
some observer-independent hyperplane of simultaneous events, and it is meant to 
signify that the part of the hyperplane that includes Rome contains sunny events. !
As I point out (352), but as we all knew already, in the special theory of relativity 
there is no such distinguished set of simultaneous events. So Dorato is surely right 
when he says that causal diamonds, if proposed as a scientific successor concept to 
our common sense concept of the present, do “not correctly pick out the events we 
intend to pick out when we use ‘now’ in ordinary language.” It is true, however, that 
nothing in M does. Let me just repeat the nice quote from Mermin (2005, xii) that I used 
to make this point: “That no inherent meaning can be assigned to the simultaneity of 
distant events is the single most important lesson to be learned from relativity.”!
So one has to make a choice. Perhaps as far as the special theory goes (and the 
general theory, insofar as it is locally Minkowskian) there just is just nothing like a 
(common sense) present to be had in those spacetimes.  Alternatively, if one wishes to 4
see what elements of our pre-relativistic concept of time one can find in relativistic 
spacetimes, one can seek some elements of or structures in Minkowski spacetime (or 
the more general class of spacetimes stipulated earlier) that more-or-less play the role 
that the common sense present did. If one does make such a proposal, one knows in 
advance that it will not encompass precisely the set of points intended when we use 
“now” in ordinary language. One looks for a “best fit,” with the criteria of fitness rather 
 6
 I argued this in Savitt (2000).4
I ♥ ♦s! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !           July, 2014
loosely specified. That is the philosophical task--assuming that there is a philosophical 
enterprise here at all.!
But if that is the game that’s afoot, then the suggestion that each event is its own 
present--no more, no less--certainly has its difficulties. It is not able to assign a truth 
value to the example above (“The sun is surely shining now in Rome.”) spoken by me 
on the West Coast, although it works well for Dorato in Rome. On the other hand, any 
reasonably sized causal diamond defined by two events on my world line, one marking 
the beginning and one the end of my utterance for instance, will include events in Rome 
and so will afford grounds for assigning a truth value to the example sentence. There 
will be many, many examples like it. Although the Arthur/Savitt proposal will indeed fail 
for some other cases (for, say, my musings about what is happening now on Mars), it 
will do the job in a host of routine situations. I submit that more in the way of 
correspondence with the common sense present cannot reasonably be asked for in 
these spacetimes and that therefore Dorato’s third criticism is simply beside the point.!
Also, if this is the game that’s afoot, then Dorato’s second criticism above is as wide 
of the mark as his third. Causal diamonds are not invoked to explain our having 
experiences of the present that are extended. Rather, our experience of the present as 
having some duration grounds the requirement (or, more moderately, suggests the 
possibility) that the relativistic counterpart of the present not be a mere point or an 
achronal set of points.!
In the penultimate paragraph of his paper Dorato says that “violations of achronality 
are admissible only for the psychological present, but not for the physical 
present,” (393) Viewed one way, this is an eminently sensible view. How could two 
events that are timelike separated, that are invariantly temporally ordered, both be 
present?  But viewed another way, this is the sort of categorical assertion that 
sometimes comes back to embarrass its author. We live with experienced presents in 
which a succession of events a second or two long do all seem present, however 
difficult it may be to articulate this experience coherently. If we are to see what of our 
commonsense concept of time is afforded to us in relativistic spacetimes, then it is not 
unreasonable to seek a counterpart of our present that has duration--though, as noted 
above, it won’t be a perfect replica of our commonsense concept. It will be local rather 
than global, for instance, if Mermin’s understanding of Einstein is right.!
 7
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I conclude that Dorato’s three arguments fail. I should stress, however, that even if 
this claim right, the discussion so far does not show that the Arthur/Savitt proposal is 
correct. It shows only that certain purported objections are not really impediments to the 




I spoke at the beginning of this paper of theorems that seem to show that the 
present for a given event in Minkowski spacetime could only be either the event itself or 
the whole of the spacetime. If that claim is correct, isn’t the Arthur/Savitt proposal 
straightforwardly ruled out?  My answer will be: no, I don’t think so. How could that be? 5
Well, theorems have conditions, and it may be possible to introduce causal diamond 
presents by (plausibly) denying one of the conditions of a key theorem. Although the 
SCH theorems are sufficiently complicated that a full discussion of them is not possible 
within the available space constraints, it is fortunate that a complete discussion of them 
is not required. A corollary that contains the material essential for my purpose here was 
extracted from the SCH results by Craig Callender (2000), and I will restrict my 
discussion to this corollary.!
Let me first just state Callender’s “No Go” result. At issue is the definition of a binary 
relation R, which is intended to represent the relation of “having become”. That is, the 
goal is to define a specific binary relation B such that Bxy holds if and only if y has 
become with respect to x, where x and y are spacetime points. Stein had proposed (and 
the proposal seems eminently reasonable) that for such a relation at least all events y in 
or on the past light cone of an event x should have become as of or for x. Hence 
condition iii) in Callender’s No Go result:!
For any binary relation R on time-oriented Minkowski spacetime, if 
R is i) implicitly definable from time-oriented metrical relations, ii) 
transitive, iii) such that, if y ∈ J−(x), then Rxy, and iv) satisfies non-
uniqueness, then R is the universal relation U. (S592-S593) 
 8
 Neither Dorato (2011) nor I (2009) discuss this objection.5
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Condition iv), non-uniqueness, is this:!
(NU)   (∃x)(∃y)(Bxy & Byx & ~(x=y))!
NU, according to Callender (S592), “merely says that at least one event in the 
universe shares its present with another event’s present.” Any reasonable 
representation of becoming should, on this understanding, satisfy condition iii. If two 
distinct points share a present, as they would in a causal diamond, then it seems that 
condition iv will be satisfied, and the becoming relation is forced to be the universal 
relation.  This looks to be a disastrous result for any account of the present other than 6
Stein’s view that each point event is its own present.!
Notice, however, that Callender’s gloss on NU contains a metaphysical assumption 
that, it seems to me, can be reasonably denied. Suppose, for example, that one wished 
to find an analog for the psychological present in a relativistic spacetime and proposed 
that some small stretch of a timelike world line γ were the appropriate structure. Then it 
would turn out that--even given the standard Stein requirement on becoming that we 
find in condition (iii) of the No Go result and even given the existence of pairs of distinct 
timelike separated events in that small segment of γ--there would not be two distinct 
points in that “thick” present that satisfied NU. Having mutually become (which is what 
NU postulates) is not the same relation as “sharing a present.” !
Similarly a causal diamond will contain (in addition to pairs of timelike separated 
events) pairs of spacelike separated events x and y such that neither Bxy nor Byx, but it 
will not contain events such that both Bxy and Byx, given the standard Stein condition 
above. The supposition that the present in a suitable class of relativistic spacetimes can 
be represented by a causal diamond does not, it seem to me, run afoul of the SCH 
theorems--unless one requires that events in (or “sharing”) a present have become with 
respect to each other. One need not suppose this, however, if one thinks of the present 
as a locus of becoming rather than as the “cutting edge” of what has become. Inside 
that present, events can be partially ordered with respect to becoming in the usual way. !
One might wish, however, in addition to the standard Stein definition, to define a 
notion of becoming relative to that present. More generally, one might wish to define 
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 Of course, I  also assuming that the first two conditions are met. 6
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becoming relative to some portion or region of a spacetime, like a causal diamond D. 
The idea is that what has become relative to D would be all events that have become 
relative to any event in D, minus D itself. If we call those events B(D), then!
B(D) ≝ {y: (∃x) (x ∈ D & y ∉ D & y ∈ I-(x))}. !7
One might call this region-relative becoming. !
If the above defence of small causal diamonds as presents in relativistic spacetimes 
is successful, it might be argued that I have proved too much. Consider just Minkowski 
spacetime for the moment. Malament (1977) has shown that, given an inertial world line 
γ and an event e ∈ γ, one can also define the unique hyperplane ∑ orthogonal to γ at e. 
That hyperplane looks very much like the pre-relativistic present, at least as far as the 
“observer” represented by γ is concerned. B(∑) would then be the part of spacetime that 
has become relative to ∑, the past, while the rest of spacetime that is neither ∑ nor 
B(∑) is the future relative to ∑. Given the naturalness of these ideas, should one not say 
that ∑, rather than D, is the (counterpart of the) present for γ at e in M?!
Given the title of this paper, the reader should not be surprised to discover that I 
think not, but I do not have a knock-down argument for my view. What I can do is offer 
three considerations that I hope will incline the reader in its favor.!
Suppose that two “observers” represented by inertial world lines γ and γ′ intersect at 
some spacetime point e. Both agree as to what has become at e in Stein’s sense, I-(x) 
(or perhaps J-(x)). This is a natural and desirable feature of a relation of having become. 
When it comes to region-relative becoming, however, neither D nor ∑ will have this 
feature. Under reasonable assumptions, however, D will come very close. !
If the specious presents along γ and γ′ centered on an event e are roughly the same 
temporal length, then their two causal diamond presents (call them D and D′) nearly 
coincide. For each diamond there is a small finite volume of spacetime which will have 
become relative to one but not the other.   The temporal difference of two points in such 8
 10
 Cf. Myrvold (2003, §2).7
 See the estimate in Savitt (2009, 357-358).8
I ♥ ♦s! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !           July, 2014
regions (in proper time) will be at most of the order of the proper times of the two 
specious presents along γ and γ′.!
For a pair of hyperplanes ∑ and ∑′ orthogonal at e to γ and γ′ respectively, the case 
is quite different. There is an infinite volume of spacetime that will have become with 
respect to each one but not the other, and there is no upper bound on the proper time 
difference between two points in these regions.  D, then, comes much closer than ∑ to 
satisfying one desideratum on a notion of the present in the way that it meshes with 
region-relative becoming.!
Secondly, the overlap of D and D′ can be used to explain our common sense 
intuition that at any given time we share a present. The hyperplanes ∑ and ∑′ have no 
such large overlap. In the standard presentations of relativity in 1 + 1-dimensional 
spacetimes, in fact, the only event they have in common is just the point of intersection 
e. !
Thirdly, if one focuses on ∑ rather than D in thinking about time in M, then it seems 
to me that one is willfully ignoring the lesson that one should learn from relativity.  Let 
me quote Mermin again: “That no inherent meaning can be assigned to the simultaneity 
of distant events is the single most important lesson to be learned from relativity.” There 
is no reason to choose this one hyperplane as opposed to the infinity of others.!
The events in a causal diamond do have an inherent meaning, as thinkers from 
Alexandrov to Dorato have pointed out. Given an inertial world line containing the 
events p and q, the causal diamond defined by p and q contains all the events that are 
“both a possible effect and a possible cause of events on the segment of the worldline 
[from p to q].” (Dorato 2011, 382) When it comes to understanding time, it might seem 
odd that the diamonds are local. But our experience is confined to our local region of 
spacetime, and relativity robs us of justification for extrapolating that experience along 
an arbitrary hyperplane. !
I think these last insights capture at least some of the thought behind my slogan: 
“Philosophy of time should aim at an integrated picture of the experiencing subject with 
its felt time in an experienced universe with its spatiotemporal structure.” (351) Dorato 
protested that the causal diamonds I proposed could not fulfill the expectations raised 
 11
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by this slogan, and in this he is surely correct. But I did not think that the mere 
suggestion that one might usefully think of causal diamonds as successor concepts for 
the present in relativistic spacetimes would complete this program in one go. At best, 
and if successful, it would be a small first step. It would locate the bits of spatiotemporal 
structure to be coordinated with the experiencing subjects and with their experiences as 
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